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INTRODUCTION 
This paper f6cuses on the trial of Sakeasi Butadroka, tl1e 
founder of the Fijian Nationalist Party, who was charged with 
unlawful assembly and inciting racial antagonism under the Fiji 
·Public Order Ordinance . This was the first major case to test 
the provisions of the Fiji Constitution adopted in 1970. It raises 
important questions about the conflict between the guaranteed 
freedom of speech and assembly, and the Government's duty to ensure 
that public order is maintained. These issues will be examined, 
and the Constitution and the Public Order Ordinance compared with 
similar legislation in other Commonwealth countries, to see 
whether . fundamental rights are adequately protected by Fiji legis-
lation . 
The paper will also look at the role of the courts in 
interpreting the Constitution, drawin g on the exp e rience of other 
Commonwealth countries; and question whether the Fiji courts are 
likely to take a sufficiently active stand to ensure that the 
constitution is upheld. This will involve some general discussion 
on the nature and effect of a Bill of Rights, and whether the mode 
of drafting fundamental rights provisions affe c ts the way in which 
they will be interpreted by the courts. This will hopefully be of 
some relevance to the discussions taking place in New Zealand and 
elsewhere about the desirability of a Bill of Rights. In addition, 
the paper will briefly examine the political aspects of the trial, 
questioning whether the trial was politically motivated and 
judged, and what the overall consequences of the trial could be . 
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THE FIJI SETTING 
General 
Fiji was a colony of Britain from 1874, when the Fijian 
chiefs ceded the country to Queen Victoria, until 1970 when it 
became independent. During that time, the country underwent 
major changes, the most important of which was Fiji's 
development as a complex multi-racial society, in which the 
immigrant races outnumber the indigenous Fijians. 
The largest racial group are the Indians, who now make up 
slightly over 50% of the total population. They began arriving 
in Fiji several years after Cession in 1874, brought by the 
British Government as indentured labourers to work on European 
plantations. When their indenture period was over, most Indians 
chose to remain in Fiji, usually as tenant sugar farmers or as 
workers in the commercial sector. Today they play a dominant 
role in the economic life of Fiji, both in the rurtil and urban 
areas. 
Much smaller in number, but also strong economically, are 
the European and Chinese residents, who each constitu~e under 1% 
of the population. There are also a large number of 
Part-Europeans, who are often middle-level workers in the urban 
areas. The majority of Fijians still live in the rural areas, 
as subsistence or semi-subsistence farmers, although many work 
in the Public Service and increasing numbers are beginning to 
enter the commercial sector. 
Fijian land has been inalienable since Cession, and as thi3 
constitutes 83% of the total land area, land is _ a crucial issue 
in Fiji. The Indian desire for a greater share of the land 
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resources, either through ownership o
r longer leases, created 
fear among the Fijians that, once the
 British left, the Indians, 
with their greater economic ~nd nume
rical strength, would seek 
to take over political power, and ult
imately the land, from the 
Fijians. It was largely this fear th
at held up the granting of 
Independence for so long, and that w
as behind much of Butadroka's 
recent agitation against Indians. 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Fiji was slow to develop parliamentar
y institutions,largely 
• because of the British belief 
that Fijian society would not adapt 
readily to western democratic ideas. 
This view was supported 
by the Fijian chiefs wl10 dealt with t
he colonial Government on 
the Fijians' behalf. However, by the
 1960 1 s both the British 
and Fijian leaders realized that Fiji
ans must become directly 
involved in the political system befo
re Independence, and so a 
period of rapid political change comm
enced. 
Fijians and women of all races were g
ranted the vote in 1963 
(Indian males had been enfranchised i
n 1929 and European males even 
earlier). This was soon followed by 
the institution of responsible 
government in 1966. The 1960
1 s also saw the development of the 
two major political parties; the pred
ominantly Indian National 
Federation Party (FNP) and the Allian
ce Party, a grouping of 
Fijian and - European interests, with s
ome Indian backing. 
The Alliance Party, led by Ratu Sir K
amisese Mara, became 
the first elected government in 1966. So
on afterwards negotiations 
were begun between the two political 
parties and the British Government 
to discuss granting Fiji full indepen
dence. A constitutional 
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conference was held in London in early 1970 to draft the final · 
constitution. 
The main arguments at the London conference were over the 
appropriate voting system to adopt, and the constitutional 
guarantees the Fijians demanded to safeguard their land and their 
protected political position. The National Federation Party 
conceded that Fijians would form a majority of the Senate 
(an appointed upper house) and that all legislation relating 
t0 Fijian land should be entrenched, so that it could not be 
changed without the consent of considerable numbers of the Fijian 
members of Parliament and Senate. The National Federation Party 
also gave up their prior demand for a common roll (i.e. the 
standard one person/one vote system). They acceded to the 
1 
existing communal roll on the assurance that this would be 
reviewed after Independence 
2 
In return, the National Federation Party demanded that a 
justiciable Bill of Rights be included in the Constitution as 
a safeguard against the Fijians abusing the political power they 
had been given. This was enacted in Chapter II of the Constitution. 
The resul~ing Constitution was reluctantly accepted by the 
Council of Chiefs, the major spokesbody of traditional Fijians. 
Although there was very little opportunity for general public 
discussion before Independence, Fiji became indepe11dent on 
October 10, 1970 in a general mood of optimism and reconciliation 
between both parties and races. 
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THE FIJI CONSTITUTION 
The Fiji Constitution was drafted in terms very similar 
to those of many new Commonwealth constitutions,particularly 
those of Nigeria and Mauritius, which in turn borrowed signifi-
cantly from the European Convention on Human Rights. In 
following these countries, Fiji rejected the traditional English 
doctrine of supremacy of Parliament in favour of adopting 
constitutional supremacy, with an entrenched Bill of Rights. 
Section 2 of the Fiji Constitution reads: 
This Constitution is the supreme law of Fiji and if 
any other law is inconsistent with this Constitution, 
that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, 
be void. 
Further, section 52 states: 
_S_u_b_.i_e_c_t __ t _o _ _ t_h_e _ _pr_ov_L_s_L_o_n_s __ o_f_ _th_~ _Co_~s_t _1:-_t_u_tLo~, 
Parl~ament may make laws for the peace, ofdei and 
good government ~f ·Fiji. 
'-. 
Section 67 specifies that the Constitution n1ay be changed 
only by a majority of two-thirds in Parliament, and, in the 
case of the fundamental rights provisions, or tliose relating to 
Fijian land and several other sections, a three-quarters 
majority is required. 
It would seem to folluw from section 2 that the Fiji courts 
have the power to interpret the Constitution and to declare any 
laws contrary to its provisions to be invalid or partially invalid. 
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This power is clearly indic~ted in sections 17 and 97 of the 
Constitution, both of which provide individuals with a right 
to direct relief from the Supreme Court. Section 17 guarantees 
this with relation to the fundamental rights provisions, while 
s97 relates to most of the other sections of the Constitution, 
with a few exceptions 3 Section 97 reads: 
If any person alleges that any provision of this Con-
stitution ... has been contravened and that his interests 
are being or are likely to be affected by such contraven-
tion, then ... that person may apply to the Supreme 
Court for a declaration and for relief under this section. 
In Butadroka's case, however, the Constitution was pleaded 
as a defence to laws which, it was alleged, were unconstitutional. 
The courts in Fiji have therefore been given an important 
role in checking that the legislature does not exceed its powers. 
In this respect, they are in a very different position from the 
courts in New Zealand or the United Kingdom, which are limited 
to interpreting and applying laws as passed by Parliament and 
where there is no organic law to refer to. This paper will try 
to examine how the courts of the new Commonwealth have generally 
exercised this role. 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 
Chapter II of the Fiji Constitution carries guarantees for 
the protection of fundamental rights. These include such rights 
as liberty of the person, freedom of religion and conscience, 
freedom of assembly and expression, freedom from discrimination 
and protection of property. 
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These are all freedoms which can be exercised under the 
common law, which . applies to Fiji. However, it was felt desirable 
to include them as constitutional guarantees as an additional 
safeguard. Unlike several earlier Commonwealth consitutions
4 
where such rights were only expressed as objects or a preamble 
to the Constitution, they can be directly enforced in Fiji, as 
indicated by s.17 of the Constitution. 
The inclusion of an enforceable Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution reflects a change of attitude among many of the 
newer Commonwealth countries, which have mo,ved away from the old 
British view that a Bill of Rights was actually a hindrance to 
good government. Such traditional objections were voiced by the 
Simon Commission in 1934 5 : 
Either the declaration of rights is of so abstract a 
nature that it has no legal effect of any kind, or its 
legal effect will be to impose an embarrasing restric-
tion on the powers of the legislature and to create a 
grave risk that a large number of laws will be declared 
invalid by the courts. 
While these objections have some validity, particularly 
as to whether a declaration of rights should be drafted broadly, 
as the United States Constitution is, or more narrowly, as is 
the case of most Commonwealth constitutions, the attitude 
towards Bills of Rights has changed markedly since the Second 
World War, gaining momentum with the many new states which became 
independent in the 1960 1 s. This trend was shown with the adop-
tion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, followed 
later by illore specific United Nations covenants, and also the 
European Convention on Human Rights in 1950, by which Britain is 
bound, and which was extended to cover Fiji, among other British 
colonies, in 1953. 
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Commonwealth countries, particularly those with significant 
ethnic or religio~s minorities, and those where democratic ideas 
might not be so well established as in nritain, have usually 
favoured the idea of a Bill of Rights, particularly on becoming 
independent. The British Minorities Commission of 1958, looking at 
the position of minority groups in Nigeria before Independence 
accepted this when it said: 
A LBill of Ri g htE7 defines beliefs widespread among 
democratic countries ana providt:ci a standard to 
which appeal may be made by those whose rights are 
infringed. A Government determined to abandon 
democratic courses will find ways of violating them 
but they are of great value in preventing a steady 
deterioration in standards of freedom and the 
unobtrusive encroachment of a Government on 
individual rights. 
It is worth noting that many Bills of Rights, particularly 
in the African Commonwealth countries, have not managed to withstand 
the political and social pressures placed on them and have either 
been suspended or are no longer enforced
7 . This fact supports 
the view of the Minorities Commission that a Bill of Rights is 
not an ultimate solution, but that, as de Smith states.
8 "It may 
well be found that ... basic rights of individuals receive firmer 
protection from the courts than the legislatures." 
It is too early to tell if a Bill of Rights will have this 
desired effect in Fiji, but its very existence probably p1·ovides 
a measure of security to its citizens. The Butadroka case is a 
clear example of thi8. When he began agitating for the removal of 
Indians from Fiji or for denying them their rights within Fiji, 
people were able to point to .the Bill of Rights and reassure themselves 
that such ideas, if implemented, would be unconstitutional. Later, 
Butadroka used the Constitution as a defence against an alleged 
breach of con3titutionality on the part of the legislature. 
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Commenting on the Fiji Constitution, M.S. Sahu Khan said: 9 
It seeks to balance the claims of a pluralistic 
society. It has a Bill of Rights as a check on 
the illegal exercise of governmental and legis-
lative powers and it also has corresponding 
provisions for their enforcement .... Thus, the 
Constitution in Fiji attempts to establish 
an equilibrium not only between the state on 
one hand and the individual on the other, but 
also amongst the ethnic groups of a pluralis-
tic society .... in Fiji,if there is an 
irreconcilable difference between an act of 
Parliament and a provision of the Constitu-
tion, the Constitution must prevail. 
THE FIJIAN NATIONALIST PARTY 
The first elections after Independence, in 1972, were won 
by the Alliance Party once again. These elections seemed to 
confirm the impression that multiculturalism was working well 
in Fiji. However, by the time the next elections were held, 
in 1977, the scene had changed considerably. 
In 1973, a relatively unknown Assistant Minister of 
Commerce and Co-operatives, Sakeasi Butadroka, began agitating 
for the eviction of Indian tenants holding leases on Fijian land. 
As a result of his anti-Indian statements and criticism of the 
Government's handling of native land, he was expelled as an 
Assistant Minister and from the Alliance Party. However, he 
remained a member of Parliament, and, in 1974, formed his own 
Fijian Nationalist Party (FNP). 
The Fijian Nationalist Party began to build up significant 
support, attracting some prominent Fijian leaders who were 
disenchanted with the other two political parties. The party 
credo of "Fiji for the Fijians" and its calls for the expulsion 
of Indians, .tapped a feeling of discontent among many Fijians 
who felt that the Government was not doing enouth to assist 
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their development. This support included the heavily Fijian 
dominated and militant Fiji Dockworkers and Seamen's Union, 
and some of the newly eme~ging Fijian businessmen and commercial 
farmers. Butadroka argued that the Alliance politicians were 
~oo concerned with their own self-interest to do anything for 
the poor of Fiji. Fur~her, he alleged that Ratu Mara had 
11 sold out 11 Fijian interests at the London Constitutional 
Conference in 1970, leaving the way open for Indians to take 
over. Butadroka advocated a new Constitution, under which only 
Fijians could be members of Parliament, or alternatively, that 
the Indians should be 11 sent home to India." 
At the same time as the Alliance was facing problems with 
the Fijian Nationalist Party, the Na~ional Federation Party 
was also experiencing a split in its ranks. The Leader of the 
Opposition, Mr Koya, was also being accused of "selling out 11 
the interests of his supporters, the Indians, at the London 
Conference. However, the National Federation Party remained 
together, at least in name, until after the April 1977 elections. 
THE GENERAL ELECTIONS OF APRIL 1977 
Despite the Alliance Government's confidence that it would 
be re-elected, the election results came as a shock to almost 
everyone in Fiji. Of the 52 seats in the House of Representatives, 
26 h3d gone to the National Federation Party, only 24 to the 
Alliance, one to the Fijian Nationalist Party (Butadroka himself) 
and one to a Fijian independent. As neither of these two would 
ally themselves with the major parties, the Alliance Government 
resigned and the National Federation Party seemed set to become 
Fiji's first predominantly Indian government. 
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The defeat of the Alliance was largely a result of effor~s 
of the Fijian Nationalist Party, which polled 25% of the Fijian 
vote, and a very low Fijian poll overall. By splitting Fijian 
10 
votes on the "n~tional" (cross-voting seats), the Fijian 
Nationalist Party provided the chance for Fijian National 
Federation Party candidates, backed by Indian votes, to be 
elected. Also, Butadroka had persuaded many Fijians to cast 
informal votes in the Indian "national" electorates, once again 
favouring the National Federation Party candidates. Thus Butadroka 
had a considerable role i11 bringing about the very government he 
had warned Fijians against; i11· fact is it likely that he desi~ed 
this result in order to prove his point that Indians would take 
over political control. 
As it turned out, however, the National Federation Party 
did not immediately take up the chance to form a government. 
With their bare majority and internal dissension, tl,ey were slow 
to nominate a Prime Minister, and in the meantime, the 
Governor-General had asked Ratu Mara to form a minority government 
(the propriety of this action is another con~titutional saga in 
itself). The new Alliance Government was soon defeated in a 
no-confidence vote and new elections were called for September 
1977. At this later election, the Alliance regained a large 
majority of seats, including the one that Butadroka had held. 
THE FIJIAN NATIONALIST MEETING OF APRIL 7TH 
Three days after the result of the first elections became 
known, and just before the surprise appointment of Ratu Mara as 
( 
Prime Minister, the Fijian Nationalist Party held a large meeting 
in the Suva Civic Centre. The meeting was restricted to Fijians, 
but not just to members of the Party, although all those who 
entered the auditorium were required to pay $1.00 and were given 
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a membership receipt in return. On this basis, the Supreme Court 
held that it was~ public meeting. 
A number of Fijian Nationalist Party leaders spoke, including 
Butadroka and the other two accused, Iona Walisoliso and Jone Kama. 
Butadroka 's speech said ( among other things) : 11 
This meeting will decide the destiny of Fiji tomorrow, 
whether it will be destroyed by fire or not, live or 
die .... from the time the results were known, I changed 
the colour of my bow tie. Red for danger, red for 
bloodshed .... This is Easter - die - be beaten to death 
in Fiji, those who wanted to sell the Fijian race .... 
This is the end of Ratu Mara's political life, as well 
as the Allianc~. Give it a hand .... Fijians be prepared .... 
Police, Army or whatever is nothing to us .... all Fiji will 
march on 23rd May - we'll convene an emergency meeting 
30 days from the 23rd April. This is our demand in our 
land here - and it's got to be accepted; if they don't 
accept, bloodshed .... This meeting has agreed .... to inform 
the Government to amend the Constitution /so? that all 
Cabinet members are all Fijians. That we-get a reply 
31 days from 23rd April .... if not, then I don't know the 
end .... our document will go to an Indian Government .... 
The Fijians demand their rights which they want back. 
It is clear from these statements that though Butadroka was 
talking of bloodshed, he envisaged that this might take place over 
a month away, once the Government had failed to act on the Fijian 
Nationalists' petition, and not immediately. His statements were 
followed by those of Walisoliso, which were more violent and 
anti-Indian than Butadroka's, and possibly more likely to provoke 
an immediate reaction. 
However, despite the enthusiastic reaction from the crohQ to 
these statements, the meeting dispersed without any disturbance. 
Later that same day, it was annou~ed that Ratu Mara had been 
;\ 
sworn in as Prime Minister, and much of the apprehension at the 
thought of an Indian government abated. 
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THE CHARGES 
On April 16, Butadroka, Walisoliso and Kama were arrested. 
All three were charged with taking part in a illegal assembly 
contrary to section 11 of the Public Order Ordinance 1969. 
This section provides that it shall be an offence to take part 
in a public meeting unless a permit has been issued under 
section 8 of the Ordinance. Section 8(1) states: 
Any person who wishes to organise or convene a llleeting 
or procession in a public place shall first make an 
application for a permit in that behalf to the 
appropriate authority and, unless such authority is 
satisfied for good reason that such a meeting .or 
procession is ~ikely to prejudice the maintenance of 
peace and good order, he shall issue a permit .... 
In Fiji, the "appropriate authority" is the District Officer, 
an employee of the Ministry of Rural Development. The District 
Officer had not been approached to issue a permit for the meeting. 
Butadroka and Walisoliso were also charged with inciting 
racial antagonism, contrary to section 17(1)(a)(iii) and 
12. 
section 17(1)(c) of the Public Order Ordinance. Section 17(1) 
• 
reads: 
Any person who by words, either spoken or intended to 
be read or by signs or Ly visible representation or 
otherwise -
(a) spreads any report o~ makes any statement which is 
likely to -
(i) incite racial dislike or hatred of any race 
or community; oc 
{ii) promote feelings of emnity or ill will between 
different races or com~unities; or 
(iii) prejudice the public peace; 
(b) makes any intimidating or threatening statement in 
relation to a race or community other than his own, 
which is likely to arouse fear, alarm or a sense of 
insecurity amongst members of that other race or 
community; 
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(c) spreads any report or makes any statement which 
incites to violence, counsels disobedience to law .. 
shall be . guilty of an offence .... 
Butadroka was also charg~d with incitement to violence and 
disobedience of the law, un<ler section 16(c) of the Ordinance. 
This charge was later droppetl1 but is referred to in K
ermode J's 
ruling. It reads: 
Any person who, without legal excuse, the burden whereof 
shall lie upon him, utters, spreads or publishes any 
words or does any act or thing, knowing or implying that 
it is or may be desirable to do, or omit to do, any act, 
the doing of or the omission to do which is calculated -
(c) to prevent or defeat by violence or by other unlawful 
means the execution of or the enforcement of any 
written law or lead to the defiance or disobedience 
of any such law, shall be guilty of an offence .... 
THE FIJI PUBLIC ORDER ORDINANCE 
The .Fiji Public Order Ordinance was first passed in 1969, 
a year before Independence. It could be significant that this 
was one year after the rather traumatic 1968 by-elections, held 
as a result of an Opposition walk-out of the Legislative Council. 
This had been a period of considerable racial tension, with some 
minor outbreaks of violence. 
The Ordinance was amended in 1976, to specifically cover 
incitement to racial antagonism. This change was recommended 
by the Fiji Royal Commission on Crime which presented its 
report that year. 
When the amending bill was introduced in Parliament, the 
Attorney-General said he thought that alJ. parties, with the 
exception of one, were committed to racial harmon .y and would 
support the amen<lment, which he said was intended to create a 
strict liability offence. It was clear from frequent references 
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to Butadroka, that his recent actions, especially in seeking to 
have Indians deported from Fiji, were very much in the minds of 
members of Parliament. The Attorney-General made this obvious 
when he saic! he could already "identify the first person who 
would be a recipient of attention by the Police". Predictably, 
Butadroka opposed the amendment on the grounds that a law cannot 
prevent people from saying what they want. The Opposition, while 
supporting the amending bill, felt concerned that it was not 
positive enough and that they would have preferred a Race Relations 
Bill.On the other hand they argued that making section 17 a strict 
liability offence was too restrictive of statements made without 
any ill-will. They also expressed their concern that decisions 
to prosecute would be made by the Government instead of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions, as section 17(4) of the Ordinance 
states: 
No prosecution shall be instituted under this section 
without the consent of the Attorney-General. 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY PROVISIONS 
At the trial, defence counsel argued that section 8 and 
section 17(1) were in violation of the Fiji Constitution's 
guaranteed rights; that is of sections 3, 12 and 13 of Chapter II, 
the Bill of Rights. These sections read as follows: 
3. Whereas every person in Fiji is·entitled to the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the jndividual, 
that is to say, the right, whatever his race, place 
of origin, political opinions, colour, cree<l or 
sex, but subject to respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others and for the public interest, 
to each and all of the following - namely -
(a) life, liberty, security of the person and the 
protection of the law; 
(b) freedom of conscience, of expression and of 
assembly and association; and 
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(c) protection for the privacy of his home aud other 
property and from deprivation of property without 
compensation, 
the provisions of this Chapter shall have effect for the 
purpose of affording protection to those rights and 
freedoms subject to such limitations of that protection 
as are contained in those provisions, being limitations 
designed to ensure that the enjoyment of the said rights 
and freedoms by any person does not prejudice the rights 
and freedoms of others or the public interest. 
THE TRIAL 
Section 12 of the Constitution states: 
(1) .... no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment 
of his freedom or expression, that is to say, 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and 
impart ideas and information without 
interferance .... 
(2) Nothing contained or done under the authority 
of any law shall be held to. be inconsistent 
with or in contravention of this section to the 
extent that the law in question makes provision -
(a) in the interests of defence, public safety, 
public order, public morality or public 
health; 
(b) for the purpose of protecting the 
reputations, rights or freedoms of other 
persons .... 
(c) for the imposition of restrictions upon 
public officers, 
except so far as that provision or, as the case may 
be, the thing done under the authority thereof is shown 
not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. 
Section lJ(l) states: 
Exceptwith his own consent, no person shall be 
hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of assembly 
and association, that is to say, his right to assemble 
freely and associate freely with other persons .... 
Section 13(2) is the same as section 12(2) except that 
section 13(2)(b) is not as detailed as section 12(2)(b). 
The trial was held in the Supreme Court of Fiji in August 
1.3 
1977. The Crown Prosecutor called witnesses who testified that 
they had been frightened by what the accused said, and that they 
I 
I 
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were afraid there would be a breach of the peace. It is 
significant that of the six witnesses, five were police officers 
and the other a prison warder. The prison warder recorded the 
speeches at the meeting, and these recordings were used in 
evidence. 
The de1 1' did ,,. t , ,, I 1 , u y witnesses and did not give 
evidence , nstead, their counsel relied on the argument that 
since Che Public Order Ordinance was in breach of the Constitution 
no offence was committed. In his ruling on the constitutionality 
of the law, Kermode J. quickly rejected these claims and held that 
the Ordinance was not contrary to the Constitution. 
The three court assessors (who decide questions of fact 
while the judge decides questions of law) found all three accused 
guilty of taking part in an unlawful assembly, but discharged 
them under this section. Walisoliso was found guilty under 
section 17(1)(a)(iii) of prejudicing the public peace and fined 
$100, while Butadroka was found guilty of both sections 17(1)(a)(iii) 
and section 17(1)(c) of inciting violence and sentenced to six 
months imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently. 
" 
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KERMODE J 1 S RULING 
Kermode J 1 s ruling on the constitutionality of the Public 
Order Ordinance 1969 and the· 1976 amendment to it, touches 
only briefly on fundamental rights questions. It is submitted 
that he does not examine these questions adequately or provide 
support for the conclusions he reaches, which is unfortunate, 
given the constitutional importance of this case. 
The defence argued ,that certain sections of the Ordinance were 
ultra vires the <:;onstitution, infringing sectiol)s 12 and 13, which 
relate to freedom of speech and assembly. ~s noted, both these 
sections allow legislation which makes provisions~ 11 in the 
interests of defence, public safety, public order, public 
moralit~y or public health. 11 , 
Kermode J. compares this with the wording of section 17(1) 
(a)(iii) of the Public Order Ordinance which refers to statements 
likely to 11 prejudice the public peace 11 • He states that; 
The words 11 public order 11 have 
with 11 breach of the peace 11 by 
LT96i/2 All E.R. 729, 731. 
been treated as synonymous 
Lord Parker in Ward v. Holman 
Lord Parker was not actually equating 11 public order 11 and a 
"breach of peace. 11 Instead, he merely held that a neighbourhood 
dispute in the street was a breach of the peace which came within 
the ambit of section 5 of the Public Order Act. Although the 
Public Order Act was passed mainly with a view to controlling 
political demonstrations, section 5 is more general in nature and 
reaus: 
Any person who in any public place or at any public meeting 
uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour 
with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a 
breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned, shall be 
guilty of an offence. 
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It is submitted that the situation in Ward v. Holman 
is not relevant tq the present case, where there is no public 
dispute, and the likelihood O'f the meeting prejudicing the public 
peace is more remote. Furthermore, under the British statute it 
is necessary to have intent, which is not required in section 17(1) 
(a)(iii) of the Fiji Public Order Ordinance , an important 
difference wh i <'11 • . l J lw di ... , ,. · ' . 
NeithPr \, ard v. Holman nor Kermode J I s ruling aP.sw~r the 
essent i al question as to what is meant by "public order" and 
whether it extends beyond prejudicing the public p~ace. While 
the British Public Order Act seems to adhere to the rather narrow 
definition of "public order", both the Fiji Public Order Ordinance 
and the Constitution seem to envisage a more general definition. 
Sections 8 and 15 of the Ordinance refer to "peace and good order" 
and sections 12 and 13 of the Constitution u Ee the phrase "in 
the interests of defence, public safety1public order,public 
morality and public health". Both of these suggest that "order" 
could encompass concepts of public regulation and organization, 
even public harmony, that exten& beyond merely preventing breaches 
of the peace, 
Such an intended meaning is certainly likely, g iven the 
Fiji Constitution's derivaticn from the European Convention on 
Human Rights. In that Convention, "public order" (or "ordre public", 
the French term which is often used) was certainly intended to -cover such a wide meaning. 
Therefore, it is submitted that the "public peace" as referred 
to in section 17(1)(a)(iii) of the Public Order Ordinance is in 
fact a narrower concept than "public order" as used in sections 
12 and 13 of the Constitution. However, as keeping the peace 
is an integral part of the 11 ordre public 11 , it is submitted that 
I 
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Kermode J. was correct in his conclusion that section 17(1)(a)(iii) 
is the sort of law envisaged by section 12 of the Constitution. 
But this is not necessarily ~o say that the whole of section 17 
is intra vires the Constitution, as Kermode J. assumes, nor does 
it mean that any law relating to public order is automatically 
protected by the limits to section 12 of the Constitution. 
Wheth~r in fact such a law is constitutional will also depeud 
on whether it is "reasonably justifiable in~ democratic society", 
as stated in sections 12 and 13. In discussing this, Kermode J. 
states that democracy does not permit a person to say whatever 
he likes, and that the freedoms granted by the Constitution must 
be limited so as not to infringe on the legitimate rights of others. 
He quotes from Wooding C.J. in Collymore and Abraham v. Attorney 
General LT96Z7 12 W.I.R., 9: 
My first observation is that individual freedom in any 
community is never absolute. No person in an ordered 
society can be free to be anti-social. For the protection 
of his own freedom everyone must pay due regard to the 
conflicting rights and freedoms of others. If not, freedom 
will become lawless and end in anarchy. Consequently, it 
is and has in every ordered society always been "tt.e function 
of the law so to regulate the conduct of human affairs as 
to balance the competing rights and freedoms of those who 
comprise the society." 
The Collymore case, which concerned the right of trade unions 
in Trinidad to go on strike despite legislation forbidding 
"essential industries, '' from doing so, 1vent to the Privy Council, 
14-
where the Board agreed with Wooding C.J. that: 
Freedom to associate /is guaranteed in the Trinidad 
Constitution? confers-neither the right nor the licence 
for a course of conduct or for the commission of acts 
which in the view of Parliament are inimical to the 
peace, order and good government of the country. 
It is on the basis of this "balance of freedoms and rights" 
that Kermode J. concludes "In my view section 17 of the Ordinance 
is not ultra vires the Constitution." In reaching this conclusion, 
. ., . 
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he has not examined whether section 17, either section 17(1)(a)(iii) 
which relates to prejudicing the public peace, or the many other 
parts of section 17, do in fact reflect the balance about which 
he speaks. Nor does he discuss the strict liability nature of 
section 17(1)(a)(iii) and whether it is "reasonably justifiable" 
not to require intent in such an offence. In order to determine 
these que s l. i , 
in d La i l 
have had to look at section 17 
~c ~ue whether the provisions are in fact ''reasonablew 
and " j ustifiable" - a question which, it will be suggested later, 
could be open to doubt in relation to some parts of section 17. 
UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY 
The defence also contended that sections 8 and 11 of the 
Public Order Ordinance, relating to unlawful assembly, were in 
breach of the Constitution in part because they conferred an 
unfettered discretion on the authority issuing the permit. 
Kermode J.pointed out that a whole range of activities listed 
in section 8(5), which covers such things as sporting, social and 
religious fixtures, do not require a permit. Those meetings which 
are not covered by these exceptions, he says, are not necessarily 
prohibited as, "the authority concerned is bound to issue a permit 
unless he is satisfied for good reason that such a meeting is 
likely to prejudice the maintenance of p e ace and good order." 
Therefore, he decides there is not an unfettered discretion 
on the part of the authority for "If the aut hori t y acts capriciously 
and ir. an arbitrary . manner in refusing a permit an aggreived person 
is not left without a remedy at law". As sections 8 and 11 make 
provisions in the interests of "public order", Kermode J. finds that 
they fall within section 13(2) of the Constitution, which limits 
the rights of assembly and so are not ultra vires. 
/ 
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Once again, Kermode ~ does not attempt to answer the question 
whether sections 8 and 11 are "in the interests of .... public order" 
or are "reasonably justifiable in a democratic society". Although 
he says that meetings are not prohibited, in fact all but the 
exempted categories are unlawfu\ unless one has first obtained 
a permit. It can be argued that this requirement is both 
unnecessary to maintain public order and an unjustifiable derogation 
from the right to assemble freely, and that there must be clear 
and compelling reasons for section 8 and 11 to exist before they 
can be regarded as constitutional. Kermode J. does not even . try 
II to justify the restrictions. 
Instead>he takes the view that as the law is not overly 
oppressiva, and because the sections concerned purport to deal with 
public order, they must be constitutional. This approach is not 
the one envisaged by section 13 of the Constitution~which begins 
with the proposition that there is a right to assemble freely, and 
this right is only to be restricted under certain conditions, and 
then only if the restrictions are reasonably justifiable. Instead 
of adopting the analysis suggested in section 13, Kermode J. assumes 
the sections are constitutional to begin witl~ This approach would 
not be approved by the Privy Council) which held in Oli v,i_*F v·. 
Buttigieg LT9627 1 A.C. 115, 13 6, that: 
Where fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual 
are being considered, a court should be cautious before 
accepting the view that some particular disregard of them 
is of minimal account. 
While it is true that there would be remedies against 
"capricious or arbitrary" refusal to grant a permit, either through 
the courts or the Ombudsman, such remedies will be slow and possibly 
not very effective, unless the courts are prepared to review critically 
the authority's exercise of discretion (as will be dis~ussed later) . 
. ., -
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INCITING VIOLENCE AND DISOBEDIENCE 
Butadroka was charged with inciting violence and disobedience 
under section 16 ( c) of the Public Order 01 ·dinance, but this charge 
was later dropped. The defence had contended that section 16(c) 
was unconstitutional in that it placed the burden on the accused 
to prove that there was a lawful excuse for his actions. This, 
they claimed, was contrary to section 10(2)(a) of the Constitution 
which states that ''every person who is charged with a criminal 
\ 
offence shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty." 
While Kermode J. correctly states that section 16(c) is not 
a strict liability offence, he goes on to say that the prosecution 
must prove all the elements of the offence, without defining what 
the parameters of the offence are. Clearly the prosecution must 
prove the "actus reus" of the offence, but the "mens rea" is 
presumed unless the defence can prove otherwise. This raises the 
question whether proof of guilt includes a guilty mind ao well as 
a guilty act. Presumably it does not necessarily do so in regard 
to either strict liability offences, or those which, like section 16, 
presume "mens rea". It is submitted that section 10(2)a is merely 
a codification of the common law "presumption of innocence", and 
as such,would cover strict liability offences. 
However, what Kermode J. does not discuss is whether sections 
16 and 17(1) (which creates a full strict liability offence) are 
"reasonably justifiable in a democratic society". As both 
are quite serious criminal o f fences, it could be strongly argued 
that it is unreasonable f or the prosecution not to have to prove 
intention in order for the accused to be guilty of the offence, 
in order ·to prevent unjustifiable restrictions on freedom of speech . 
._,= .....,:,,-...------,...,...., ............... c-r-.,......_,.._.,.........,......,.,~ ... € ........ -..--.... ,,-................. ~ .... , .,_,-.--.------····-.,....,.---....... .,.,...,..,.-,~..,....---~-~--~-· 
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While Kermode J. admits that both section 16 and section 17 
are drawn in wide terms, he regards them as still being enforceable, 
and so not unconstitutional. . It is unfortunate that he does not 
attempt to define their meaning in order to substantiate this view. 
As one df the first cases involving an interpretation of the 
Constitution, this case is of considerable importance, particularly 
as it relates to such basic rights as freedom of assembly and 
expression. In glossing over crucial questions of constitutional 
interpretation, Kermode J. has set a very vague and doubtful 
precedent for later courts to follow. 
It is worth noting here that a similar approach was taken in 
the only other case involving an interpretation of the Fiji 
Constitution which I have seen any reference to. The case of 
R. v. Mohammed Hanif (1972) Supreme Court, No.12 (unreported) 
involved an illegal search by the police. It was argued that 
evidence obtained in this search should be excluded as lt breached 
section 9 of the Constitution, which provides that "··· .no person 
shall be subjected to the search of his person or his property .... 11 
except in the same circumstances as outlined in ss 12(2) and 13(2) 
abov~,or with a court order. The judge Grant J., it seemst ignored 
the effect of section 9 and the Constitution when he held: 1S 
In view of the power to enforce protective provisions and 
provide redress conferred on the Supreme Co~rt by section 17 
of the Fiji (onstitution ;;hich provides 3ccess to the Court 
where there has been a breach of fundamental rights_7, I am 
not persuaded that the Supreme Court would be justified in 
implying an exclusionary rule and I think, on balance, that 
the Common Law principle should prevail. 
Kermode arid Grant JJ's approach suggests that Fiji courts 
may not be prepared to take an active role in examining the 
constitutionality of legislation, and so the courts may not fulfill 
their role in protecting the rights of citizens against legislative 
above. This restrictive approach has certainly been the practice 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLIN6TON 
- 24 -
of many of the Commonwealth courts, which have tended to 
presume that legislation is constitutional unless it is clearly 
proven not to be so. This is a practice which could undermine 
the value of fundamental rights provisions significantly, and 
Fiji should consider its ramifications carefully. 
0 
- 25 -
INTERPRETATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PRO
VISIONS 
Kermode J's handling of fundamental righ
ts issues in the 
Butadroka case raises the question of ho
w the courts should 
interpret Constitutional provisions in o
rder to achieve the 
'balance of interests II he recommends. To 
determine this, it is 
useful to look at t.he pra c tice of courts
 in other countries. 
THE AMERI ( ' , VIEW 
Th e approach taken by the United States 
is that freedom 
of assembly and speech are basic and any
 limitations of those 
rights must be imposed only when strictl
y ne£essary. This is the 
view of most United States courts interp
reting the First 
Amendment which reads: 
Congress shall make no law . ... 
. of speecn, or of the press; or 
peaceably to assemble .... 
abridging the freedom 
the right of the people 
Schenk v. Unites States 249 U.S.47,52(19
19) held that 
these rights could only be restricted wh
en: 
ore. 
.... the wordsAused in such circumstances
 and are of 
such a nature as to create a clear and p
resent danger 
that they will bring about the substanti
al evils that 
Congress has a right to prevent. 
In Thomas v. Collins 323 U.S. 516,530 (1
945) this~ view 
was elaborated: 
This case confronts us .... with the duty 
our sy3tem places 
on this court to say where the individu
al's freedom ends 
and the State's power begins. Choice on
 that border, now 
as always delicate, is perhaps more so w
here the usual 
presumption supporting legislation is bal
anced by the 
preferred place given in our scheme to t
he great, the 
indispensible democratic freedoms secure
d by the 1st 
Amendment. Tpat priority gives these li
berties a sanctity 
and a sanction not permitting dubious in
trusions. And 
it is the character of the right, not of
 the limitation, 
which determines what standard governs t
he choice. 
For these reasons, any attempt to restri
ct those liberties 
mu s t be justified by clear public intere
st, threatened not 
doubLfully or remotely but by clear and 
present danger. 
The rational connection between the reme
dy provided and the 
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evil to be curbed, which in other contexts might support 
legislation against attack on due process grounds, will 
not suffice. These rights rest on firmer foundations. 
Accordingly, ·whateve r occasion would restrain orderly 
discussion in p e rsuasion .... must have clear support in 
public dan ge r, actual or impending. Only the gravest 
abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion 
for permissible limitation. 
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
The Eur n • ron v C'nLi n11 . RS ,1 lready noted, provided the 
, ;iS I • I , , . ,_.._._ ..,u Constitutions, and as a result, the 
fund ~ ~ntal rights provisions are drafted very similarly. 
Art icle 10(2) of the Convention, which relates to freedom of 
expression reads: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This 
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to 
receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority .... 
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with 
it .duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such 
formalities,conditions, restrictions or penalties as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety for the prevention 
of dis-0rder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, for preventing the disclosure of information 
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority 
and impartiality of the judiciary. 
This provision was interpreted by the European Court in the 
- ,~ 
Sunday Times Case (1979) when it held: 
It is not sufficient that the interference involved 
belongs to that class of the exceptions listed in Article 
10 ( 2) _{the freedom of expression provisio~7 which has been 
invoked; neither is it sufficient that the interference 
was imposed because its subject-matter fell within a 
particular category or was caught by a legal rule, 
formulated in general or absolute terms: the Court has to 
be satisfied that the interference was necessary having 
regard to the facts and circumstances prevailing in the 
special case qefore it. 
COMMONWELATH CONSTITUTIONS 
Most · of the recently independent Commonwealth countries 
have freedom .. of expression and assembly provisions similar to 
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those of Lhe European Convention on Human Rights and ss 12 and 13 
of the Fiji Constitution, with slight changes of wording. While 
Article 10 of the Convention ·allows for laws which are "necessary 
in a democratic society", some countries use the words 
11 reasonably required. 11 Whether these slight variat,ions make 
any substantial difference will be discussed. 
It can be seen that while the First Amendment is couched 
in very broad terms, leaving it up to the court to work out what 
the leg itimate limitations of the rL g hts are, Commonwealth Bills 
of Rights tend to spell out the limitations more specifically in 
the Constitution itself. The crucial question to determine is 
how the judges interpret the various terms and whether their 
wording, or even their very existence, makes any difference in 
guiding the courts in their interpretation of fundamental rights .. 
THE PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY 
Perhaps the most important aspect of interpretation of 
fundamental rights .is the "presumption of constitutionality". 
· courts, both in the CommonwealLh and even at times the United 
States, have tended to adopt the approach that a law is presumed 
to be intra vires the Constitution until it is shown not to be, 
unlike the view advocated by the European Court and many American 
cases. This presumption reflects the view that the legislature, 
as a body elected by the people, has the best idea what laws 
are needed and does · not intentionally pass laws which are 
ultra vires. The Privy Council stated that: 
Unless it becomes clear beyond reasonable doubt that the 
legislation in question transgresses the limits laid down 
by the organic law of the Constitution, it must be allowed 
to stand as the true expression of the national will. 
(Shell Co. of Australia Ltd v. Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation ' L193!/ AC 275, 298.) 
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This view was recently reiterated in the case of the 
Attorney-General & an. v. Antigua Times L197~7 A.C. 16,32 where 
the Privy Council held: 
In some cases it may be possible for a court to decide 
from a mere perusal of an Act whether it was or was not 
reasonably required. In oLher cases, has evidence to be 
brought before the court of the reasons for the Act and to 
show that it was reasonably required? Their lordships 
think that the proper approach to the question is to 
presume, until the contrary appears er is shown, that all 
Acts passed by the Parliament of Anti~ua were reasonably 
required. This presumption will be rebutted if the 
statutory provisions in question .... are so arbitrary 
a s to compel the conclusion that it does not involve 
an exertion of /a legitimate? power but constitutes in 
substance and effect, the direct execution of a different 
and forbidden power. 
This view is no doubt prompted by most courts' reluctance 
to enter in to the political arena unless absolutely necessary, 
and is an attitude shared by most Commonwealth courts, not only 
the Privy Council but also the Nigerian courts in the early 
1960 1 s, and on occasion the Indian and West Indian courts. 
This view is understandable, as, if the courts regularly 
become invol vea in conflicts wi t11 the legislature, their 
reputation and independence could be considerably undermined. This 
could reinforce the pressures to appoint 'politically suitable" 
judges. There is also the fear that if the courts take too active 
a role in determining the validity of legislation, they will take 
over the role of the legislators, making decisions of vital 
importance without being accountable to the citizens in the way 
elected representatives are. This is a criticism that has been made 
of the United States Supreme Court decisions, and is something which 
the less well-established courts of the new Commonwealth would 
probably be anxious to avoid. 
In the case of the Commonwealth courts, there is also the 
tradition of parliamentary sovereignty to overcome. In most 
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l·s relat1·vely new, and often judges have not countries, the Constitution 
adjusted to the additional powers they now possess. This is 
particularly the case with reg~rd to the judges of the Privy Council 
who, for the most part are acting as British judges, but who 
occasionally have to don the hats of judges of some Commonwealth 
countrY. far removed from their own situation. ' Given both their 
lack of everyday experience with written constitution~, and their 
remoteness from the country involved, it is hardly surprising 
that the law lords tend to take the attitude that the "legi s lature 
know s best". As the Privy Council held in Akar v. Attorney-General 
of Sierra Leone LI97Q7A.C.8S3, it was not concerned with "the 
wisdom, or desirability or fairness of passing a measure ... but 
only with its validity" However, it went on to say that it felt 
the Act concerned "offends against the letter and flouts the spirit 
of the Constitution" Despite the fact that the legislation was 
clearly discriminatory, a dissenting judge still held that the law 
was probably passed in good faith and so should be upheld. 
The attitude of the Privy Council appears to be that while 
- they are prepared to strike down laws which discriminate only 
agninst certain sections of the population, they are much more 
reluctant to interfere with laws which contain general restrictions 
on the freedoms of citizens, regarding these as political questions 
to be left to the legislators. 
This approach can be seen from the decision in Akar v. Attorney-
General where the Privy Council struck down legislation that was 
racially discriminatory, and also in Olivier v. But tigieg 
where an executive decision which restricted freedom of expres~ion of 
one particular political party was held to be unconstitutional. In 
other recent ca~es, however, the Privy C~uncil upheld legislation 
which curtoiled freedom of speech and assembly in general, as in the 
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case of Attorney-General v. Antigua Times /197~7 A.C. 16, where 
a law placing very stringent requirements on the registration of 
newspapers was held to be constitutional. 
On the whole, other Commonwealth courts seem to have taken 
a slightly less conservative approach towards fundamental issues, 
as seen in so~e of the decisions of the West Indian courts and the 
Supreme Court of India, which overrule unconstitutional legislatio11. 
Huwever, these courts have also tended on the side of caution. 
This attitude 8uggests that many courts are not really 
fulfilling their role in ensuring that fundamental rights are 
protected, or perhaps that it was unreasonable to think that 
courts could play a major role in the first place. While courts 
may be reluctant to handle politically sensitive issues, they 
were grapted such powers by the constitution particularly because 
it was felt that the courts would be the best guardians of those 
rights. 
This point is clearly expressed in The Board of Education v 
Barnette 319 U.S. 624, 638 in 1943: 
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain 
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to 
place them beyond the reach of magistrates and officials and · 
to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the 
courts. One's right to life, liberty and property, to free 
speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly and 
other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they 
depend on the outcome of no elections. 
How Do Courts Interpret Reasonably Justifiable ~n a Democratic 
Society 
When the courts do decide to look critically at legislation, 
they are faced with the very difficult task of deciding what 
really is "reasonably justifiable in a democratic society". This 
problem was de~~t with in the Indian case of Madras v. Rowe LT9SI7 
S.C.R. 597, 607: 
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In evaluating such elusive factors and forming their own 
conception of what is reasonable in all the circumstances 
of a given case, it is inevitable that the social 
philosophy and the scale of values of the judges 
participating in the decision should play an important 
part, and the limit to their interference with the 
legislature's judgement can only be dictated by their 
sense of responsibility and self-restraint and the 
sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant not 
only for people of their own way of thinking but for all, 
and that the majority of the elected representatives of 
the people have, in authorizing the imposition of the 
restrictions, considered them to be reasonable. 
A similar view was taken by the Nigerian Federal Supreme 
Court, in the D.P.P. v. Chike Obi [196}..7 All N.LR. 186,197 when it 
said: 
It is . right that the courts should remember that their 
function is to decide whether a restriction is reasonably 
justifiable in a den,ocratic society, not to impose their 
own views of what the law should be. 
Though this is no easy task,judges have to try to balance 
the conflicting interests. This will involve them in questions 
of policy into which courts are usually reluctant to enter. 
They will have to look at the reasons for the legislation, and 
at the general circumstances surrounding the case. Much of the 
evidence before tha co~rt has t,o be of a nature which would not be 
admissable in normal court proceedings. All of this will place 
a considerable burden Oti the courts to decide just what :actors 
are relevant to the case. Whereas the United States Supreme Court 
has a long tradition of such enquiries, very few Commonwealth 
judges will have the same experience and precedents to guide t,hem. 
However, while this is an ~cknowledged problem associated with a 
justiciable Bill of Rights, the framers of the various Commonwealth 
Constitutions have decided to give the courts this interpretive 
role, and they must attempt to fulfil it. 
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Drafting Differences 
It appears that whether constitutional rights are limited 
when II reasonably necessary 11 , '.' reasonably required" or "reasonably 
justifiable 11 rarely makes any difference to the decisions 
Commonwealth courts reach, on questions of tundamental rights. 
In all the cases, the courts are involved in similar situations 
of balancing t h, 
state. 
nr,,,leting rights of I h e individual and the 
I t i S submitted,however, that at times, the precise wording 
could make a difference. Laws may be "reasonably justifiable 11 
yet not reasonably required or necessary. Furthermore laws which 
are required etc may not be reasonably so. It seems that very 
few courts have seriously considered what the differences amount 
to, but it is possible that the more liberal approach taken by 
the European Court towards fundamental rights is to some degree 
affected by the fact that any limitations imposed must be "necessary" 
whereas, in F .ij i, they need only be II reasonably justifiable 11 • It 
also seems that the strong stand taken by the United States Supreme 
Court in some cases, could be attributed to the broad wording of 
the First Amendment. This is not to say that the wording used will 
automatically determine the role taken by the courts - this will 
depend far more on their overall situation of the country and the 
position of ·the judiciary within that society. 
The Position in Fiji 
It is most likely that the Fiji courts will follow the trend 
of most other Commonwealth countries in adopting the presumption 
of constitutionality and generally refusing to take an active role 
in questioning the validity of laws. This is not only because 
of Lheir recent tradition of parliamentary soverignty and reluctance 
to become involved in political arguments, but also suggested by the 
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limitations provided in the provisions themselves, unlike the 
United States provisions which contain no such limitations. 
Sections 12 and 13 state that laws which provide for the 
rr.aintepance of public order and other aspects of public interest, 
will be cuns~itutional even if they restrict citizens' fundamental 
freedoms, unless such laws are shown not to be reasonably 
justifiable _in a democratic society. This means that as long as 
a law falls within one of the exceptions mentioned in the 
Constitution, it is prima facie valid, and can only be invalidated 
if it is shown not to be. This places the burden of proof on 
the person challenging the legislation, instead of on the 
legislature, or body responsible for the restrictions. 
17 
As stated by Sahu ~hau, referring to this question: 
This is a very unfortunate state of affairs. It undermines 
the real value of the fundamental rights provisions which 
were intended to protect the indi~idual from the arbitrary 
actions of the Government - executive and legislature. 
Su1ely, the state should have the onus of proving that a 
certain state of affairs exists, justifying the invoking 
of the provisos, exceptions and qualifications of the 
fundamental rights provisions. As the position stands today, 
the impression is given that the fundamental right is the 
exception rather than the rule. 
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UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY 
In order to determine whether sections 8 and 11 of the Fiji 
Public Order Ordinance, relating to unlawful assembly, are in fact 
"reasonably justifiable in a democratic society 11 ,it is useful to 
compare them with similar legislation overseas. This provides a 
means of testing legislation to see whether it reflects the 
balance of rights and freedoms Kermode J. desires. 
The Fiji Public Order Ordinance is similar in scope to the 
British Public Order Act of 1936, in that both Acts are primarily 
concerned with making sure that public meetings are peaceful. 
However, the acts do differ significantly in their methods of 
authorising public meetings. 
Permits 
Whereas the Fiji Public Order Ordinance, section 8, provides 
that a permit must first be issued by the appropriate authority~ 
the Public Order Act, section 3, gives the Chief Officer of Police 
the power to in t ercede if he thinks a meeting (or procession) will 
constitute a threat to the public peace. In such cases, he may 
direct the meeting to be held elsewhere, or at another time, but 
he does not have the power to prohibit the meeting entirely without 
the consent of the Secretary of State. Even then, the meeting can 
be banned only for a maximum period of three months. Thus, while 
in Britair., meetings are prima facie legal and are difficult to 
ban, there are far fewer safeguards against restrictions in Fiji. 
As the District Officer is required to grant permission before a meeting 
is legal, he is probably more likely to decide that there are 
reasons not to issue the permit, than a Chief Officer of Police in Britain , 
would be likely to actively intervene to stop a meeting taking place. 
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In the United States, there has been considerable antipathy towards 
permits as constituting a ~rior restraint'' on the freedom of speech 
and assembl~ In Hague v. C.I.O. 307 u.s.496 (1939), the Supreme 
Court held: 
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they 
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the 
public and ... for the purposes of assembly, communicating 
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions . 
. . . The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use 
the streets and parks for communication of views on national 
questions may be regulated in the interests ofall; it is 
not absolute, ... but it must not, in the guise of regulation, 
be abridged or denied. 
Judicial Review 
If apermit is refused in Fiji, there is no procedure for an 
appeal to a higher administrative level, although, as Kermode J. 
~entions in his ruling, there is still a remedy at law. Presumably 
this would be through a writ of mandamus or an appeal to the 
Ombudsman. However, it may be difficult to prove that the District 
Officer has actually abused his discretion. The law provides that 
the authority may refuse to issue a permit if he "is satisfied, for 
good reason, that such a meeting or procession is likely to prejudice 
the maintenance of peace and good order". A court must decide what 
constitutes "good reason". If it ado~ts a subjective approach, as 
was used by the House of Lords in Liversidge v. Anderson L19417 
A.C. 206, the authority's actions will be legitimate, as long as he 
acted in good faith. If however an objective approach is adopted, the 
court will have to examine the circumstances surrounding the permit 
application and decide for itself whether it thinks there was good 
reason for the refusal. 
It is submitted that the court should take this latter approach. 
The Ordinance suggests this when it says, there must be '~ood' reason 
an objective criterion. Also, the court's role in seeing the 
' 
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Constitution is upheld seems to necessitate such an inquiry. As 
section 8 of the Orqinance is one which restricts the rights of assembly 
the court must be in a position to ensure that this fun<lamental 
right is not unjustly curtailed. This apprpach has been evident 
in several West Indian cases, where legislation requiring permits 
has been held unconstitutional i n that it conferred an unfettered 
discreti n ,I l , ,lt" • ~ r I 0l10rity ( Chief of Police v. Powell [1966} 
12 W.I.R. 403 and an unreported case from Antisua, St. Luce's 
Speak i ng case (1973) are e xamples of this).However, in Francis v. 
Chief of Police [1973) A.C.761, 1970 15 W.I.R.,9, both the Privy 
Council and West Indian a2p_e_al court upheld legislation requiring 
a permit to use a loud hailer for a public meeting, a situation which 
it is submitted is very different from merely holding a public meeting. 
Similarly, in the United States, the courts have been more ready to 
uphold legislation requiring permits for loud hailers (as in Kovacs 
v. Cooper 336 U.S. 77 1949) than general requirements of a permit 
for any public meeting. 
It is therefore submitted that> while .sections 8 and 11 ,do not 
obviously grant an unfettered discretion upon the issuing authority, 
the experience of other counties suggests that Kermode J. should 
have examined this question more closely than he did. 
INCITING RACIAL ANTAGONISM 
A separate offence of inciting racial antagonism is relatively 
new in many countries, although previously it would have been covered by 
laws against abusive and threatening language, sedition or criminal 
libel. This change has come about partly as a result of ratification 
of the United Nations Convention on all forms of Racial Discrimination, 
in particualr Article 4 of the Convention, under which the states 
party to the agreement, undertake to "adopt ~mmediate and posi~ve 
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measures designed to eradicate all incitement to or acts of Lracial7 
discrimination 1.'. 
Legislation 
Although Fiji did not become bound by the Convention on Racial 
Discrimination until at least 1978, section 17 of the Public Order 
Ordinance was amended to specifically cover racial propaganda. 
Similarly, new legislation wa~ adopted in the United Kingdom in 1965, 
with the Race Relations Act, and in New Zealand, with the Race 
Relations Act of 1971 and HumanRights Commission Act of 1977. 
However, there are significant differences between s17(1) of the 
Fiji Public Order Ordinance and the New Zealand and British legislation. 
Section 6(1) of the Un~ed Kingdom Race Relations Act reads: 
A person shall be guilty of an offence under this section 
if,with intent to stir up racial hatred against any section 
of the public in Great Britain distinguished by colour, race 
or ethnic or national origins-
(a) ' he publishes or distributes written matter which is 
threatening, abusive, insulting; or 
(b) he uses in any public place or at any public meeting 
words which are threatening, abusive or insulting; 
being matter or words likely to stir up hatred against that 
section on grounds of colour, race or ethnic or national origins. 
Section 25 of the New Zealand Race relations Act is essentially the 
same, although worded in more detail. The marked difference between 
these provisions and section 17(1) of the Ordinance is that the 
Race Relat~ons Acts require that statements must be made with intent 
to cause hatred or ill-will, and that they be made in public, 
whereas neither of these criteria are present in Fiji. 
Intent 
The absense of intent in the Fiji legislation raises the 
question whether it is reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society. It is significant that s9A of the New Zealand Race 
Relations Act i"s also a strict liability provision. However, this 
' 
- 38 -
section,which was inserted by the Human Rights Co
mmission Act 197,7 
is not an offence, but creates an unlawful act wh
ich can provide 
the basis of conciiiation proceedings. 
As both the New Zealand and British legislatures 
have seen 
fit to include intent as an element of the offenc
e of inciting 
racial hatred, is it reasonably justifiable that 
this is not the 
case with the Fiji lcg i s lc li o11? J t., rou]d be argu
ed that racial 
propaganda is undesirable whatever its intent, an
d that the fact 
that the speaker did not intend his words to have
 the effect they 
did, would serve as little compensation to member
s of the race or 
group maligned. It could therefore be argued that
 preventing such 
statements from being made at all is more importa
nt than the 
possibility that a person could be unjustly punis
hed, particularly 
in Fiji, with its multi-racial society. 
On the other hand, it can be argued that criminal
 offences 
of this nature should not be ones of strict liabi
lity, particularly 
when they restrict fundamental freedoms. In fact, 
there is still 
a considerable body of opinion that believes that
 offensive 
statements, even those made with intent to cause 
ill-will or 
hostility, should be restricted as little as poss
ible. In 
the Handyside case, decided. by the European Court
, the Court held: IS 
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the esse
ntial 
foundations of a democratic society; subject to p
aragraph 2 
of Article 10, it is applicable not only to inform
ation 
or ideas that are favourably received or regarded
 as 
inoffensive or as a matter of indiffernece,but als
o to 
those that shock or disturb the state or any sect
or of 
the population. 
A similar view was taken in Terminello v.Chicago 
337 U.S.1 (1947) 
where Douglas J. helq: in relation to racial propaga
nda 
... A function of free s~0ech under our system of 
government .is 'to invite dispute. It may indeed be
st serve 
its high purpose when it induces a condition of u
nrest, 
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they a
re, or even 
stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocativ
e and 
challenging. It may strike at prejudices and pre
conceptions 
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and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for 
acceptance of an idea .... 
It is submitted that such views are particularly relevant 
in relation to section 17(a)(iii) of the Public Order Ordinance, 
which relates to statements likely to prejudice the public peace. 
A speaker will usually to be able to determine when his words 
are likely to i 1o1 , . •· J',H' i ;:11 hat,r<>d, are intimidating towards other 
races or c ounsel disobedience to the law, and therefore such 
statements are unlikely to make without intent. However, it is 
much more difficult to gauge when there may be a breach of the 
peace. There are many situations where speakers must be free to 
voice their opinions on very controversial issues (other than just 
racial propaganda) which may possibly cause a breach of the peace. 
Whether in fact it does so will depend on the nature of the 
speaker's audience, as well as what is said. There are many, often 
conflicting cases, on this subject, two of the better known bein~ 
Be~ v. Gillbanks (1882) 9 QBD 306
1 
and Duncan v. Jones [1936) 1 KB 
218. In Beatty v. Gillbanks the Salvation Army were held not to 
be responsible for the violent reaction their peaceful march caused, 
whereas in Duncan v Jones, Mrs Duncan was responsible for the 
reaction her speech caused. In general it seems that speakers 
should not be guilty under section 17(1)(a)(iii) unless a 
reasonable person in their position could apprehend that a 
breach of the peace was likely to result from his/her statements. 
In Public? 
As for the question about whether the offence should be 
limited to statements made in public, I think it is clear that they 
should. There is no way of policing statements made in private, 
and any attempt to do ~o woul<l definitely constitute an intrusion 
' 
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of privacy. It is significant that section 17(3) of the Ordinance 
makes it an offence to possess any document which mi ght incite 
racial disharmony, unless t~e person can prove that he had no 
intention of passing the document on to others. Even i l a similar 
test was adopted with respect to statements made with the intention 
that the recipient does not pass the statements on, this may 
constitute a r • .1. 1·;.i, t, ('d rr s I r i c t i rrn o n f rcedom of expres::;ion. 
Ther , Jr e i t dppears that section 17(1) may not be a law 
which i ') " reasonably justifiable in a democratic society". It is 
submi t ted that Kermode J. &ho uld have at least examined the facts 
of the case closely to determine whether there was actually an 
infringement of section 17(1)(a)(iii) and section 17(1)(c). He 
could even have gone further and declared section 17(1) as 
unconstitutional, in that it is drafted too widely to be a 
justifiable limitation on freedom of expression. 
THE POLITICAL NATURE OF TH E TRIAL 
The case of R· v. Butadroka is significant not only for its 
constitutional ramifications and for the issue relating to racial 
propaganda, but also because of its political overtones, both 
in bringing the prosecution and in the result of the trial. 
The Prosecution 
In Fiji, prosecutions of this nature are broug ht by the 
Director of Public Prosecutions, an independent officer appointed 
by a special commission. However, be f ore a prosecution under 
section 17 of the Public Order Ordinance can proceed, section 17(4) 
provides that the consent o f the Attorney-General must be obtained 
first (As the new ~overnment was only a week or so old at the 
time of Butadroka's arrest, and it appears there was no 
Attorney-General at the time, one wonders who gave this permission). 
.) 
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This requirement of the Attorney-General's consent is quite 
commol! in Commonwealth countrie~ particularly where politically 
sensitive issues m~v he involved. Howe v e n this power has been 
criticised, as it ,,,uld be open to abu ~ r· fo r the political ends 
of the Government, as recent cases in 1cw Zealand, would suggest 
(in particular the Ocean Beach prosecutions,·where charges which 
had become politically embarrassing for the Government were withdrawn 
by the Attorney-General} , While the Attorney-General is meant to 
act independently in reaching a decision, it will be very d "fficult 
for him to divorce himself from his party affiliations. 
To what extent ~as this problem influential in the present 
case? As early on as 1976, the Attorney-General was pointedly 
saying he knew who the first person the police would investigate 
would be. There is no doubt that the Alliance Government would 
have welcomed the opportunity for Butadroka to be convicted and 
imprisoned, particularly after the defeat the party had just 
suffered, largely at his hands. It was already obvious that there 
would have to be another election~ soon, in which the Alliance 
would have to work hard to win back Fijian votes and to convince 
Indians that the allegations that the Government secretly supported 
Butadroka's ·ideas were unfounded. A conviction which discredited 
Butadroka and possibly even caused him to become ineligible 
to fight the election would certainly help th~ir position. 
{As it turned out, Butadroka was still eligible to stand, though 
he had to do so from prison). 
These questions are also significant in the light of the fact 
that Butadroka had been making racially provocative and 
anti-Government statements for years, but he was prosecuted for 
them only after the election. While it is Lruc that it was a period 
of tension and uncertainty in Fiji, Butadroka's and Walisoliso's 
statements did not cause any breach of the peace or disobedience to 
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the law, nor were Butadroka's remarks particularly abusive towards 
other races (especially when contrasted with many of his previous 
statements). Moreover by the time the Fijian Nationalist leaders 
were arrested, Fiji's "political crisis" was largely over. 
It is also significant that it is quite common for politicians 
in Fiji to make statements which could easily incite racial 
antagonism, particularly to communal audiences, which are very 
rarely publicised in the English language media. However, the 
Fijian Nationalist Party politicians are the only ones who have 
so far been charged under section 17(1). 
While these points do not necessarily mean that the Director 
of Public Prosecutions and the Attorney-Ge neral, or whoever was 
acting on his behalf, authorised the prosecution for the wrong 
reasons, the possible political interpretation cannot be ignored. 
The Trial 
The trial itself also contained political overtones, with 
the prosecution witnesses being five police officers and a prison 
warder (although perhaps these were just the easiest witnesses to 
contact, and, as the defence did not produce any witnesses, there 
was little need to look any further). 
The policemen, told the court how frightened they had been 
by the statements that were made at the meeting, although most 
could explain why they felt that way and said they would have been 
too frightened to intervene in any way to prevent a breach of the 
peace. Most admitted that the mood of the meetir.g was joyous, but 
two expressed the opinion that all that was needed was a signal 
from the leaders and the crowd could quite easily have been roused 
to anger. 
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Almost al the police officers commented on the violence of 
Walisoliso's statements, commenting on his cals to Fijians to 
be ready to fight, and how he said tha~ if necessary, he was quite 
prepared to chalenge an Indian to a fight, because Indians were 
not wanted in Fiji. In relation to Butadroka's comments,they 
spoke of his cals for a petition and constitutional amendments -
they seemed less ~~ 0hPnsive about hi~ speech. 
It Jc: • lJv te 1 • • • '-'"' l,i!e evidence given by these witnesses 
what th, . ood of the meeting was, and whether the hundreds of other 
spectators felt the same w. y a.c:; the police officers. In this 
respect it is most unfortunate that the defence at least did not 
cal on other witnesses, who may wel have presented the situation 
differently from ti,e manner which the prosecution witnesses did. 
It appears that. the court did not examine carefuly whether in 
fact a breach of the peace was likely to occur, or whether Butadroka's 
words were likely to incite disobedience to the law. 
The final aspect of the trial is the judges summing up, at 
which he said: 
I bear in mind that at the time you made the speeches 
Fiji was in a state of political crisis and you as wel 
as many others in Fiji were concerned about the future. 
Nevertheless .. your closing speech was probably as bad 
as you ~ould have made. You are a man who has been a 
Member of Parliament for a number of years and you 
should have known your Constitution. You knew when you 
spoke to the audience they were concerned, and you knew 
but you did not point out to them that as far as the 
Fijian people were concerned, their land and customs 
have an entrenched position.given by Fijian and Indian 
leaders and others at the London Constitutional Confe~ence. 
Kermode J's emphasis on the adequacy of the Constitution is 
significant in that at the time the Constitution was drawn up, 
he was a member of the Aliance Party and Speaker of the Legislative 
Council. Therefore, he was present at the London Conference, as one 
of the Party's representatives. His atitude seems to suggest that 
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the Constitution should be beyond reproach, and that all citizens 
ahould recognise the adequacy of its protections. Clearly this 
would be a completely unwarranted restriction of freedom of speech, 
as anyone is entitled to question the value of legislation or the 
actions of leaders and this includes the Constitution and those 
who were responsible for it. 
Kerm 0,: . n · r J suggest he personally believ~s 
that the , t, _.u1 0 1...u H titutional system should remain, but seems 
to prov ide substance for the idea that people who have been closely 
associated with a politica l µarLy should not be appointed to the 
judiciary. Even when judges act in a completely non-partisan 
manner, any pro-Government decision will immediately be labelled 
as biased. This will do little for the judiciary's reputation 
as independent, particularly with regard to its role as a watch-dog 
over the legislature. The judges must decide what is 
constitutional by examining the provisions of the Constitution, 
not by deciding for themselves was the law should be. 
by Sahu Khan that: '' 
It was stated 
The political society existing in Fiji is a dynamic and 
progressive one. It is hoped that the courts will not 
close their eyes to the realities of life and will not ; 
adhere to a legalistic approach to matters which require 
urgent settlement. The courts must administer justice, 
particularly in the constitutional field, irrespective 
of the fact that their decisions may be embarrassing to 
politicians. The courts in Fiji must be careful not to 
get the 1eputation of the Nigerian courts of whom it was 
stated that 'in Nigeria, the courts seldom ruled against 
the Government and never in· election cases'. The Courts 
must be guided by the words of the Constitution and not 
by English conventional rules. 
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SArE SI Bl TADROK!:i. & OR!J • 
RULING 
I have fully considered tho argument by learned Queen'R 
Counsel for the accused and learned Counsel for the prosecution 
and the authorities .quoted ... 
The main argument is that certain sections of the Public 
Order Ordinance are ultra vires the I'ij i Independence Ord.er 1 970 
whi6h embodies the Constitution of Fi~i, 
In particular the Ordinance is alleged to infringe sections 
1 2 ru1d 13 which deal Hith two fundG.I!lental rightG and freedons of 
• the individual, namely protection of freedom of express~on n.lid 
freedom of assembly and association. 
Both section 12 nnd 13 contain simil2.r restrictions of such 
freedoms and so far as the instant· co.sr, is c0~1cerned the 
limitations are contained in subsections 2 of eo.c"i of the sec t ions 
e.s follows: 
"Nothinf, contained in or done under the authority 
of any law shall be held to be ir:consistent with 
or in contravention of this section to the extent 
that the law in question I'.!akes provision -
(a) in the interests of .•• public 
order, • • • 11 
Section 17 1 (a)(iii) of the Public Order Ordinance as amended 
by the Public Order (Amendment) _\et, 1976 refers to "prejudice 
the public peace 11 • 
The words "rublic Order" have been treated a.s syno'1.~ous with 
"breach of the peace" by Lord ''arkcr in Ward v. HoJ . a..'1. ( 1964) 
2 All B.R. 729 at page 731. 
The I>ublic Ordf'r Ordinance dealing as it does j_'1 ,, ,3ction ~ 7, 
with reports er statements likely to ~,rE:j ' .,lice the public pe8.ce 
is a law which makes provision in the interesto of public order 
envisagGd by section 12 of the Constitution. 
Both section 1 2 and sGction 13 however contains a further 
qualification namely that tho law must be shown not to be reo.sonably 
justi~iablc in a democratic society. 
) So far as the principles of d8r.1ocrac:v are concerned I do not 
conside r such principles permit a person to say what he likss under 
the banner of f~eedom of speech.· Suer: ·fr-eedorJs as the Consti cution 
confe r on an individual must be exercised so as not to infr:ince 
the l 8giti~ate rights and freedoos of others . 
I find myself in agreemont with tho dictum of Wooding C .J. 
in Collyf'.'!o r e; 2.nd ill,.brahamv . Icttor~1ey_"-cneral (1967) 12 W.I.R.. nt 
page 9, quoted in Francis v . Chief of Police (1970) 15 Y . I.R.. at 
page 8 . I quote: 
"My first observation is that individuo.l freedom in any 
community is nev'?:r aboolute . l'.ifo person in an orderE:d 
society can be free to be anti-soci~l. ror the 
protection of his own freedom everyone must pay due 
regard to the conflicting ri[;hts o..nd freedoms of others. 
If not; freedor.1 will become lawlesG and end in anarchy. 
Consequently 9 it is and h"..s in every ord.cred society c:,hrays 
been the fu.'1.ction of the law so to rcgul:-i.te the conduct of 
human af'L1irs as to belance the corn.petinc rights and 
freedoms of those w ho comprise tlie society . ·, 
In my view section 17 of the l'ublic Order Ordin1:1.nce is not 
ultra vires the Constit~tion. 
Mr . Newman also argued that sections 8 a.ad 11 of the 
Ordinance are ultra vires the Constitution and criticised the 
unfettered discretion of the authority concerned to withhold a 
pe r mit . Subsection 5 of the section 8 exempts a very wide 
range of meetings c It exempts sporting recreational or socia~-
events or fixtures 1 any private entertainment or assembly for 
religious or charitable purposes. T!lis covers a very wide area 
of hwnan activity in which the freedoo of an individual to 
assemble and associate is unrestricted. 
Section 8 ( 1) is limited to any meetinG or procession other 
than those excluded by subsection 5 which are h8ld in o. public 
plac e. For such meetings or processio"l.s a per .it must first bo 
obtai'1ecl. 
Section8( 1) does not prohibit sue."'. meetinr:;o. The authority 
concerned ie bound to issue a permit ·mless he is satisfied. for 
good reason that such a meP ting is likely to r,.,.,ejudice t'1~ 
mRintenance of peace a_d good order. 
In my view section 8 ( 1 ) does not con!'er a..ri unfE:ttercd discretion 
on the autbori ty to refuse a permit. If the authority acts 
capr iciously and in an arbitrary manner in refusing a permit an 
aggr ieved person is not left wj_thout a remedy at law o 
e 
' inteTests of public order within the meaning of section of 
the Consti tuticrn a."1.d are not in my view ul tro. virGG the Consti tlltion. 
1~s regards sect ion 16 of the Ordinance and the pro vis ion which 
throws on the defence the burden of establishing a lawful excuse 
for his actions. This provision is in my view merely dGclar2.tory 
of the law where the offence is not one of absolute liability. 
The section does not absolve the prosecution from its oblig~tion 
to establish all the eleQents of tho offence beyond reason2ble 
doubt. It is then open to the defence to establish th3.t there was 
a lawful o.x:ouae for his actions. 
Section 16 does not infringe section 10(2)(a) of the 
Constitution - the prosecution must establish the guilt of the 
accused. Nor for reasons which I have siven as rec;ards ~.ection 17 
is the section ultra vires the Constitution. 
Both section 16 and section 17 are drnwn in wide terms but 
they are not in my view vague or too ,;-.ride. Section 17 could have 
been set out mare clearly but there is no doubt th::tt the offence 
referred to in subsection 1 (c) also refers to subsections (a) "'.nd 
(b) • 
I hold that the sections of the fublic Order Ordinance relevant 
in this case are not ultra vires the Constitution, nor are they 
vague or unenforceable. 
I have expressed doubts about the vagueness of the 4th count 
e f but as Mr. Lindsay has undertaken to furnish '!lore particulars I 
say no more about this count. 
Suva, 
9th 11. ugus"u , 
{ote 
1 97 7 0 
Signed (R. G. Kermode) 
.J rnrr:c --
Section 10(2)(a) of the Constitution provides: 
Every person who is charged_with a criminal offence - (a) shall be 
presumed ~o bl innocent until he or ho.s pleaded :~uil ty •• •. 
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